Abstract. A serious concern with quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes is that, when under attack, the quantum devices in a real-life implementation may behave differently than modeled in the security proof. This can lead to real-life attacks against provably secure QKD schemes.
Introduction
Background. Quantum key distribution (QKD) makes use of quantum mechanical effects to allow two parties, Alice and Bob, to exchange a secret key while being eavesdropped by an attacker Eve [5, 11] . In principle, the security of QKD can be rigorously proven based solely on the laws of quantum mechanics [27, 33, 31] ; in particular, the security does not rely on the assumed hardness of some computational problem. However, these security proofs typically make stringent assumptions about the devices used by Alice and Bob to prepare and measure the quantum states that are communicated. These assumptions are not necessarily satisfied by real-world devices, leaving the implementations of QKD schemes open to hacking attacks [25] .
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Despite the practical motivation, our result is of theoretical nature. This is because, as in all contemporary fully DI schemes, our analysis (implicitly) assumes that every qubit sent by Alice is indeed received by Bob, or, more generally, whether it is received or not does not depend on the basis it is to be measured in; this is not necessarily satisfied in practical implementations -and some recent attacks on QKD take advantage of exactly this effect by blinding the detectors whenever a measurement in a basis not to Eve's liking is attempted [25] .
Our analysis of BB84 QKD with one-sided DI security admits a noise level of up to 1.5%. This is significantly lower than the 11% tolerable for standard (i.e. not DI) security. We believe that this is not inherent to the scheme but an artifact of our analysis. Improving this bound by means of a better analysis is an open problem (it can be slightly improved by using a better scheme, e.g., the 6-state scheme). Nonetheless, one-sided DI QKD appears to be an attractive alternative to DI QKD in an asymmetric setting, when we can expect from one party, say, a server, to invest into a very carefully designed, constructed, and tested apparatus, but not the other party, the user, and/or in case of a star network with one designated link being connected with many other links.
Technique. In order to prove one-sided DI security of BB84, we introduce and study a new quantum game, which we call a monogamy of entanglement game (or simply a monogamy game). This is a game of a specific form, played by three parties, Alice, Bob and Charlie. Of central importance to us is the monogamy game G ×n BB84 , which is as follows. Preparation Phase: Bob and Charlie agree on and prepare an arbitrary quantum state ρ ABC , where ρ A consists of n qubits. They pass ρ A to Alice and hold on to ρ B and ρ C , respectively. After this phase, Bob and Charlie are no longer allowed to communicate. Question Phase: Alice chooses θ ∈ {0, 1} n uniformly at random and announces θ to Bob and Charlie. Additionally, she measures every qubit ρ Ai of ρ A in the computational basis if θ i = 0, and in the Hadamard basis if θ i = 1. This results in a bit string x ∈ {0, 1} n .
Answer Phase: Bob and Charlie independently form a guess of x by performing measurements (which may depend on θ) on ρ B and ρ C , respectively. Winning Condition: The game is won if both Bob and Charlie guess x correctly.
From the perspective of classical information processing, our game may appear somewhat trivial -after all, if Bob and Charlie were to provide some classical information k to Alice who would merely apply a randomly chosen function f θ , they could predict the value of x = f θ (k) perfectly from k and θ. In quantum mechanics, however, the outcome of a measurement is in general not deterministic, and the well-known uncertainty principle [15] places a limit on how well observers can predict the outcome of incompatible measurements. For instance, if Bob and Charlie were restricted to classical memory (i.e., ρ B and ρ C are "empty"), it is not too hard to see that the best strategy gives a winning probability of (
In a fully quantum world, however, uncertainty is not quite the end of the story, as indeed Bob and Charlie are allowed to have quantum memory. To illustrate the power of such a memory, consider the same game played just between Alice and Bob. As Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen famously observed [10] : if ρ AB is a maximally entangled state, then once Bob learns Alice's choice of measurement θ, he can perform an adequate measurement on his share of the state to obtain x himself. That is, there exists a strategy for Bob to guess x perfectly. Does this change when we add the extra player, Charlie? We can certainly be hopeful as it is known that quantum entanglement is "monogamous" [34] in the sense that the more entangled Bob is with Alice, the less entangled Charlie can be. In the extreme case where ρ AB is maximally entangled, even if Bob can guess x perfectly every time, Charlie has to resort to making an uninformed random guess. As both of them have to be correct in order to win the game, this strategy turns out to be worse than optimal (see below).
An analysis of our game thus requires a tightrope walk between uncertainty on the one hand, and the monogamy of entanglement on the other. Writing p win (G ×n BB84 ) for the maximal winning probability, maximized over the choice of the initial state ρ ABC and over the measurements performed by Bob and Charlie, we prove that
We thus see that, interestingly, monogamy of entanglement wins out entirely, cancelling the power of Bob and Charlie's quantum memory -the optimal winning probability can be achieved without any entanglement at all. We also show a generalization of (1), which upper bounds p win (G ×n BB84 ) for a variant of the game G ×n BB84 for which Bob and Charlie need to guess the string x only approximately.
Our result in particular implies that p win (G ×n BB84 ) = p win (G BB84 ) n , i.e., strong parallel repetition holds. This means that one cannot play n parallel executions of the game G BB84 = G ×1 BB84 better than repeating the optimal strategy for one execution n times. Even classically, analyzing the n-fold parallel repetition of games or tasks is typically challenging. In many cases, only non-strong parallel repetition holds, meaning that p win (G ×n ) ≤ ε n for some ε < 1, but with ε > p win (G). Furthermore, proving such (strong or not) parallel repetition theorems tends to be intriguingly difficult; examples include the parallel repetition of interactive proof systems (see e.g. [29] ) or the analysis of communication complexity tasks (see e.g. [19] ). In a quantum world, such an analysis is often exacerbated further by the presence of entanglement and the fact that quantum information cannot generally be copied. Famous examples include the analysis of the "parallel repetition" of channels in quantum information theory (where the problem is referred to as the additivity of capacities), see e.g. [14] , entangled non-local games [16] , or the question whether an eavesdropper's optimal strategy in QKD is to perform the optimal strategy for each round.
In this light, our proof of (1) is surprisingly simple. It is inspired by techniques due to Kittaneh [18] and uses merely tools from linear algebra. At the core of the proof is a newly derived operator norm inequality that bounds the norm i A i of the sum of positive semi-definite operators A 1 , . . . , A N via the respective norms of the square root of pairwise products A i A j .
In the context of one-sided DI QKD, it turns out that the game G ×n BB84 pretty much captures an execution of BB84, with Eve playing the role of Charlie, and considering a gedankenexperiment where Eve measures her quantum side information in order to try to guess the raw key x Alice obtains. Our bound on p win (G ×n BB84 ) then implies that no matter what measurement Bob's device performs, if the outcome of his measurement is strongly correlated to Alice's raw key x, then Eve has a hard time in guessing x. The latter holds for any measurement Eve may perform, and as such it follows that x has lower bounded min-entropy conditioned on Eve's quantum side information. As a consequence, a secret key can be extracted from x using standard techniques.
Further Application. We expect our notion of and our results on monogamy games to find other applications. Indeed, one additional direct application is to position verification. Here, we consider a 1-dimensional setting where a prover wants to convince two verifiers that he controls a certain position, pos. The verifiers are located at known positions around pos, and they are honest and connected by secure communication channels. Moreover, all parties are assumed to have synchronized clocks, and the message delivery time between any two parties is assumed to be proportional to the distance between them.
Position verification and variants thereof (like distance bounding) is a rather well-studied problem in the field of wireless security (see e.g. the references in [9] ). It was shown in [9] that in the presence of colluding adversaries at different locations, position verification is impossible classically, even with computational hardness assumptions. That is, the prover can always trick the verifiers into believing that he controls a position. The fact that the classical attack requires the adversary to copy information, initially gave hope that we may circumvent the impossibility result using quantum communication. However, such schemes were subsequently broken [17, 22] and indeed a general impossibility proof holds [8] : without any restriction on the adversaries, in particular on the amount of preshared entanglement they may hold, no quantum scheme for position verification can be secure. This impossibility proof was constructive but required the dishonest parties to share a number of EPR pairs that grows doubly-exponentially in the number of qubits the honest parties exchange. This was reduced by Beigi and König [3] to a single exponential amount. On the other hand, there are schemes for position verification that are provably secure against adversaries that have no pre-shared entanglement, or only hold a couple of entangled qubits [8, 22, 3] .
However, all known schemes that are provably secure with a negligible soundness error (the maximal probability that a coalition of adversaries can pass the position verification test for position pos without actually controlling that specific position) against adversaries with no or with bounded pre-shared entanglement are either multi-round schemes, or require the honest participants to manipulate large quantum states.
In the full version [36] , we present the first provably secure one-round position verification scheme with negligible soundness error in which the honest parties are only required to perform single qubit operations. We prove its security against adversaries with an amount of pre-shared entanglement that is linear in the number of qubits transmitted by the honest parties.
Outline. In Section 2, we introduce the terminology and notation used throughout this work, and we derive the operator norm inequality that is central to our main result. In Section 3, we discuss the monogamy game G ×n BB84 , prove a strong parallel repetition theorem, and discuss some generalizations. In Section 4, we then make use of these results to prove one-sided DI security of BB84. The application to position verification is given in the full version [36] .
Technical Preliminaries
Basic Notation and Terminology. We assume the reader to be familiar with the basic concepts of quantum information theory; we merely fix some notation and terminology here.
Let H be an arbitrary, finite dimensional complex Hilbert space. L(H) and P(H) denote linear and positive semi-definite operators on H, respectively. Note that an operator A ∈ P(H) is in particular Hermitian, meaning that A † = A. The set of density operators on H, i.e., the set of operators in P(H) with unit trace, is denoted by S(H). For A, B ∈ L(H), we write A ≥ B to express that A − B ∈ P(H). When operators are compared with scalars, we implicitly assume that the scalars are multiplied by the identity operator, which we denote by 1 H , or 1 if H is clear from the context. A projector is an operator P ∈ P(H) that satisfies P 2 = P . A POVM (short for positive operator valued measure) is a set {N x } x of operators N x ∈ P(H) such that x N x = 1, and a POVM is called projective if all its elements N x are projectors. We use the trace distance
as a metric on density operators ρ, σ ∈ S(H).
The most prominent example of a Hilbert space is the qubit space, H ≡ C 2 . The vectors | 0 = 
n , we write |x θ as a shorthand for the state vector
, which evaluates the largest singular value of L. It is easy to verify that this norm satisfies L 2 = L † L = LL † . Also, for A, B ∈ P(H), A coincides with the largest eigenvalue of A, and A ≤ B implies A ≤ B . Finally, for any block-diagonal operator A ⊕ B we have A ⊕ B = max{ A , B }.
We need the following fact. Note that the statement does not hold in general if the projectors are replaced by general positive semi-definite operators.
Lemma 2.1. Let P, Q ∈ P(H) be projectors with P ≤ Q, and let L ∈ L(H). Then, it holds that P L ≤ QL and LP ≤ LQ .
, and the proof of the second statement follows analogously.
Applying the lemma twice, we get P Q 2 ≤ P Q 2 ≤ P Q 2 = P Q P for any two pairs of projectors satisfying P ≤ P and Q ≤ Q .
One of our main tools is the following Lemma 2.2, which bounds the Schatten norm of the sum of n positive semi-definite operators by means of their pairwise products. We derive the bound using a construction due to Kittaneh [18] , which was also used by Schaffner [32] to derive a similar, but less general, result.
We 
Proof. We define X = [X ij ] as the N × N block-matrix with blocks given by X ij = δ j1 √ A i . The two matrices X † X and XX † are easy to evaluate, namely (X † X) ij = δ i1 δ j1 i A i and (XX † ) ij = √ A i A j , respectively. As such, we see that
where the matrices D k are defined by the permutations π k , respectively, as
The requirement on the permutations ensures that XX † = k D k . Moreover, since the matrices D k are constructed such that they contain exactly one non-zero block in each row and column, they can be transformed into a block-diagonal matrix
by a unitary rotation. Hence, using triangle inequality and the unitary invariance of the norm, we get
CQ-States and Min-Entropy. A state ρ XB ∈ S(H X ⊗H B ) is called a classicalquantum (CQ) state with classical X over X , if it is of the form
where {|x } x∈X is a fixed basis of H X , {p x } x∈X is a probability distribution, and ρ x B ∈ S(H B ). For such a state, X can be understood as a random variable that is correlated with (potentially quantum) side information B.
If λ : X → {0, 1} is a predicate on X , then we denote by Pr ρ [λ(X)] the probability of the event λ(X) under ρ; formally, Pr ρ [λ(X)] = x p x λ(x). We also define the state ρ XB|λ(X) , which is the state of the X and B conditioned on the event λ(X). Formally,
For a CQ-state ρ XB ∈ S(H X ⊗ H B ), the min-entropy of X conditioned on B [31] can be expressed in terms of the maximum probability that a measurement on B yields the correct value of X, i.e. the guessing probability. Formally, we define [20] H min (X|B) ρ := − log p guess (X|B) ρ , where
Here, the optimization is taken over all POVMs {N x } x on B, and here and throughout this paper, log denotes the binary logarithm.
In case of a CQ-state ρ XBΘ with classical X, and with additional classical side information Θ, we can write ρ XBΘ = θ p θ |θ θ| ⊗ ρ θ XB for CQ states ρ θ XB . The min-entropy of X conditioned on B and Θ then evaluates to H min (X|BΘ) ρ = − log p guess (X|BΘ) ρ , where p guess (X|BΘ) ρ = θ p θ p guess (X|B) ρ θ . An intuitive explanation of the latter equality is that the optimal strategy to guess X simply chooses an optimal POVM on B depending on the value of Θ.
An overview of the min-entropy and its properties can be found in [35] . We merely point out the chain rule here: for a CQ-state ρ XBΘ with classical X and Θ, where Θ is over {0, 1} n , it holds that H min (X|BΘ) ρ ≥ H min (X|B) ρ − n.
Parallel Repetition of Monogamy Games
In this section, we formalize the notion of a monogamy game, and we show strong parallel repetition for the game G ×n BB84 . Then, we generalize our analysis to arbitrary projective measurements for Alice, and to the case where Bob and Charlie are allowed to make some errors. We typically use less bulky terminology and simply call G a monogamy game. Note that for any positive integer n, the n-fold parallel repetition of G, denoted as G ..,xn for θ 1 , . . . , θ n ∈ Θ, is again a monogamy game. Definition 3.2. We define a strategy S for a monogamy game G as a list
where ρ ABC ∈ S(H A ⊗ H B ⊗ H C ), and H B and H C are arbitrary finite dimensional Hilbert spaces. Furthermore, for all θ ∈ Θ, {P θ x } x∈X and {Q θ x } x∈X are POVMs on H B and H C , respectively. A strategy is called pure if the state ρ ABC is pure and all the POVMs are projective.
If S is a strategy for game G, then the n-fold parallel repetition of S, which is naturally given, is a particular strategy for the parallel repetition G ×n ; however, it is important to realize that there exist strategies for G ×n that are not of this form. In general, a strategy S n for G ×n is given by an arbitrary state ρ A1...AnBC ∈ S(H ⊗n A ⊗ H B ⊗ H C ) (with arbitrary H B and H C ) and by arbitrary POVM elements on H B and H C , respectively, not necessarily in product form.
The winning probability for a game G and a fixed strategy S, denoted by p win (G, S), is defined as the probability that the measurement outcomes of Alice, Bob and Charlie agree when Alice measures in the basis determined by a randomly chosen θ ∈ Θ and Bob and Charlie apply their respective POVMs {P θ x } x and {Q θ x } x . The optimal winning probability, p win (G), maximizes the winning probability over all strategies. The following makes this formal. Definition 3.3. The winning probability for a monogamy game G and a strategy S is defined as
The optimal winning probability is p win (G) := sup S p win (G, S), where the supremum is taken over all strategies S for G.
In fact, due to a standard purification argument and Neumark's dilation theorem, we can restrict the supremum to pure strategies (cf. [36] ).
Strong Parallel Repetition for G BB84 . We are particularly interested in the game G BB84 and its parallel repetition G 
The following shows the exact value of p win (G ×n BB84 ), and in particular it shows strong parallel repetition. Theorem 3.4. For any n ∈ N, n ≥ 1, we have
Proof. We first show that this probability can be achieved. For n = 1, consider the following strategy. Bob and Charlie prepare the state |φ := cos π 8 | 0 + sin π 8 | 1 and send it to Alice. Then, they guess that Alice measures outcome 0, independent of θ. Formally, this is the strategy S 1 = |φ φ|, P θ x = δ x0 , Q θ x = δ x0 . The optimal winning probability is bounded by the winning probability of this strategy,
As this bound applies to all pure strategies, we conclude the proof.
Arbitrary Games, and Imperfect Guessing. The above upper-bound techniques can be generalized to an arbitrary monogamy game, G, specified by an arbitrary finite dimensional Hilbert space H A and arbitrary projective measurements {F θ x } x∈X , indexed by θ ∈ Θ, and with arbitrary finite X and Θ. The only additional parameter relevant for the analysis is the maximal overlap of the measurements, c(G) := max F θ x F θ x 2 , where the max is over all θ = θ ∈ Θ and all x, x ∈ X . c(G) satisfies 1/|X | ≤ c(G) ≤ 1 and c(G ×n ) = c(G) n . This is in accordance with the definition of the overlap as it appears in entropic uncertainty relations, e.g. in [21] . Note also that in the case of G BB84 , we have c(G BB84 ) = In addition to considering arbitrary monogamy games, we also generalize Theorem 3.4 to the case where Bob and Charlie are not required to guess perfectly but are allowed to make some errors. The maximal winning probability in this case is defined as follows, where we again restrict to pure strategies. ))} q . Then, the optimal winning probability of G with respect to Q is
where the supremum is taken over all pure strategies S for G.
We find the following upper bound on the guessing probability, generalizing the upper bound on the optimal winning probability established in Theorem 3.4. The proof closely follows the proof of the upper bound in Theorem 3.4, and is deferred to the full version [36] . Theorem 3.6. For any positive n ∈ N, we have
Recall that in case of G BB84 , we have |Q| = 1, |Θ| = 2, and c(G BB84 ) = 1 2 , leading to the bound stated in Theorem 3.4.
One particularly interesting example of the above theorem considers binary measurements, i.e. X = {0, 1}, where Alice will accept Bob's and Charlie's answers if and only if they get less than a certain fraction of bits wrong. More precisely, she accepts if d(x, y) ≤ γ n and d(x, z) ≤ γ n, where d(·, ·) denotes the Hamming distance and y, z are Bob's and Charlie's guesses, respectively. In this case, we let Q , where h(·) denotes the binary entropy. We thus find
4 Application: One-Sided Device-Independent QKD
In the following, we assume some familiarity with quantum key distribution (QKD). For simplicity, we consider an entanglement-based [11] variant of the BB84 QKD scheme [5] , where Bob waits with performing the measurement until Alice tells him the right bases. This protocol is impractical because it requires Bob to store qubits. However, it is well known that security of this impractical version implies security of the original, more practical BB84 QKD scheme [4] . It is straightforward to verify that this implication also holds in the one-sided device-independent setting we consider here. The entanglement-based QKD scheme, E-QKD, is described in Figure 1 . It is (implicitly) parameterized by positive integers 0 < t, s, < n and a real number 0 ≤ γ < 1 2 . Here, n is the number of qubits exchanged between Alice and Bob, t is the size of the sample used for parameter estimation, s is the leakage (in bits) due to error correction, and is the length (in bits) of the final key. Finally, γ is the tolerated error in Bob's measurement results.
State Preparation: Alice prepares n EPR pairs
Then, of each pair, she keeps one qubit and sends the other to Bob. Confirmation: Bob confirms receipt of the n qubits. (After this point, there cannot be any communication between Bob's device and Eve.) Measurement: Alice chooses random Θ ∈ {0, 1} n and sends it to Bob, and Alice and Bob measure the EPR pairs in basis Θ to obtain X and Y , respectively. (Remember: Bob's device may produce Y in an arbitrary way, using a POVM chosen depending on Θ acting on a state provided by Eve.) Parameter Estimation: Alice chooses a random subset T ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of size t, and sends T and XT to Bob. If the relative Hamming distance, d rel (XT , YT ), exceeds γ then they abort the protocol and set K = ⊥. Error Correction: Alice sends a syndrome S(XT ) of length s and a random universal2 hash function F : {0, 1} n−t → {0, 1} to Bob.
Privacy Amplification: Alice computes K = F (XT c ) and BobK = F (XT c ), whereXT c is the corrected version of YT c . A QKD protocol is called perfectly secure if it either aborts and outputs an empty key, K = ⊥, or it produces a key that is uniformly random and independent of Eve's (quantum and classical) information E + gathered during the execution of the protocol. Formally, this means that the final state must be of the form
where µ K is a 2 -dimensional completely mixed state, and |⊥ ⊥| K is orthogonal to µ K .
Relaxing this condition, a protocol is called δ-secure if ρ KE + is δ-close to the above form in trace distance, meaning that ρ KE + satisfies
It is well known and has been proven in various ways that E-QKD is δ-secure (with small δ) with a suitable choice of parameters, assuming that all quantum operations are correctly performed by Alice and Bob. We now show that the protocol remains secure even if Bob's measurement device behaves arbitrarily and possibly maliciously. The only assumption is that Bob's device does not communicate with Eve after it received Alice's quantum signals. This restriction is clearly necessary as there would otherwise not be any asymmetry between Bob and Eve's information about Alice's key. Note that the scheme is well known to satisfy correctness and robustness; hence, we do not argue these here.
Theorem 4.1. Consider an execution of E-QKD, with an arbitrary measurement device for Bob. Then, for any ε > 0, protocol E-QKD is δ-secure with
where
Note that with an optimal error correcting code, the size of the syndrome for large n approaches the Shannon limit s = nh(γ). The security error δ can then be made negligible in n with suitable choices of parameters if log(1/β • ) > 2h(γ), which roughly requires that γ ≤ 0.015. Hence, the scheme can tolerate a noise level up to 1.5% asymptotically.
Proof. Let ρ ΘT ABE = ρ Θ ⊗ ρ T ⊗ |ψ ABE ψ ABE | be the state before Alice and Bob perform the measurements on A and B, respectively, where system E is held by the adversary Eve. Here, the random variable Θ contains the choice of basis for the measurement, whereas the random variable T contains the choice of subset on which the strings are compared (see the protocol description in Fig. 1.) Moreover, let ρ ΘT XY E be the state after Alice and Bob measured, where -for every possible value θ -Alice's measurement is given by the projectors {|x θ x θ |} x , and Bob's measurement by an arbitrary but fixed POVM {P θ x } x . As a gedankenexperiment, we consider the scenario where Eve wants to guess the value of Alice's raw key, X. Eve wants to do this during the parameter estimation step of the protocol, exactly after Alice broadcast T but before she broadcasts X T . 4 For this purpose, we consider an arbitrary measurement strategy of Eve that aims to guess X. Such a strategy is given by -for every basis choice, θ, and every choice of sample, τ -a POVM {Q θ,τ
x } x . The values of θ and τ have been broadcast over a public channel, and are hence known to Eve at this point of the protocol. She will thus choose a POVM depending on these values to measure E and use the measurement outcome as her guess.
For our gedankenexperiment, we will use the state, ρ ΘT XY Z , which is the (purely classical) state that results after Eve applied her measurement on E. Let ε > 0 be an arbitrary constant. By our results from Section 3, it follows that for any choices of {P θ x } x and {Q θ,τ
x } x , we have
where d rel denotes the relative Hamming distance. This uses the fact that Alice's measurement outcome is independent of T , and T can in fact be seen as part of Eve's system for the purpose of the monogamy game.
We now construct a stateρ ΘT XY E as follows.
where Ω denotes the event 
≤ Pr
We now introduce the event Γ = {d rel (X T , Y T ) ≤ γ}, which corresponds to the event that Bob does not abort the protocol. Expanding the left hand side of (7) to the min-entropy of X given Θ, T and E is evaluated for the stateρ ΘT XY E|Γ , conditioned on not aborting.) By the chain rule, it now follows that H min (X|ΘT X T SE, Γ )ρ ≥ H min (XX T S|ΘT E, Γ )ρ − t − s
≥ n(1 − α) log(1/β) − t − s .
Here, the min-entropy is evaluated for the stateρ XΘT X T SE that is constructed fromρ XΘT E by calculating the error syndrome and copying X T from X as done in the prescription of the protocol. In particular, ∆(ρ XΘT X T SE , ρ XΘT X T SE ) ≤ e −2ε
2 t . Finally, privacy amplification with universal 2 hashing applied to the statẽ ρ XΘT X T SE ensures that the key K satisfies [31] ∆(ρ KF ΘT X T SE|Γ , µ K ⊗ρ F ΘT X T E|Γ ) ≤ 1 2 β (1−α)n 2 +t+s .
And, in particular, recalling that Prρ[Γ ] = β αn , we have
Using β = 2 h(γ+ε) β • and applying Lemma 4.2 below concludes the proof.
Lemma 4.2. Let ρ XB ,ρ XB ∈ S(H X ⊗ H B ) be two CQ states with X over X . Also, let λ : X → {0, 1} be a predicate on X and Λ = λ(X), and let τ X ∈ S(H X ) be arbitrary. Then Proof. We set δ := ∆(ρ XB ,ρ XB ). From ∆(ρ XB ,ρ XB ) = δ it follows in particular that the two distributions P X andP X are δ-close, and thus that the state 
